



Through the Lens of Heidegger's Philosophy: An Analysis of Camus's Meursault in terms of Heideggerian Thrownness, Fallenness, Anxiety and Authenticity

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to look at Albert Camus's (in)famous character Meursault through the lens of Heideggerian philosophy, with a special emphasis on his concepts such as "thrownness", "anxiety", "fallenness", and "authenticity". Through a close textual analysis of Camus's *The Outsider* (also known as *The Stranger*), the study addresses a significant gap in the existing scholarship —especially within the Heideggerian readings of the text —that reads Meursault as either an apathetic person or an "authentic" *Dasein*. The present study departs from such interpretations by arguing that Meursault neither remains "inauthentic" nor completely succeeds in becoming "authentic", but gets suspended in his ontological liminality. His journey from "inauthenticity" to "authenticity" remains incomplete, maintaining an unresolved state of in-betweenness.

Keywords: Meursault, *Dasein*, authenticity, liminality.

Introduction

Despite Albert Camus's repeated insistence that he was not an existentialist, his (in)famous character, Meursault, has often been labelled an existential hero— one who recognises the inherent meaninglessness of the universe and rejects all social discourses to create his own meaning in life. Camus, however, preferred to call his protagonist an absurd hero— one who neither seeks to formulate meaning out of meaninglessness nor tries to escape the absurd. Existing research has furthered such discussions by reading Meursault's story through absurdist,

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existential, postcolonial, and feminist lenses. Some have concluded Meursault's condition as being a manifestation of pure apathy. Others have read Meursault through a Heideggerian lens, though without addressing his ontological liminality— a reading that renders him as neither apathetic nor “authentic” but a *Dasein* suspended in-between. Therefore, this paper examines Meursault through Heidegger's concepts of “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*), “fallenness” (*Verfallen*), “anxiety” (*Angst*), and “authenticity” (*Eigentlichkeit*) to establish that he embodies an ambiguous state where *Dasein* can neither remain “inauthentic” nor become fully “authentic”. It is in this ambiguity and unresolved in-betweenness that his predicament lies.

Literature Review

Louis R. Rossi (1958) provides an early Heideggerian reading of Meursault's journey, arguing that his eventual acceptance of guilt and death helps him enact his freedom and achieve “authenticity”. This paper departs from such an understanding by demonstrating that Meursault neither realizes his guilt nor takes any responsibility until the end of the text. Omar Khali (2021) takes a similar approach and arrives at the conclusion that Heideggerian anxiety often leads to apathy in individuals and results in undesired outcomes. Alba Amoia (1989/2001) also reads Meursault's understanding of absurdity in terms of apathy. She claims that Meursault accepts his verdict of death “without reaction or emotion, without anger or contrition” (p. 55) and ultimately allows “himself to be condemned to death through sheer apathy” (p. 60). However, to claim that Meursault accepts his death sentence without a reaction would be a fallacy. His desperation to escape the guillotine, his daydreams about new laws granting the condemned man a second chance, his constant fear of the guards coming for him at any time, and his ultimate outburst before the priest all suggest the opposite of a person without “reaction” and “emotion”. Meursault's actions might appear indifferent, but he is anything but apathetic. He has a strong sexual urge, and his ultimate outburst reveals his ability to feel intensely. Again, Robert C. Solomon and Mary Gennuso regard his actions as symptomatic of emotional immaturity. Solomon (1978/2001) suggests that he “is a demonstration, even despite the author's intentions, of the poverty of consciousness. . .” (p. 64). Gennuso (2014) supports Solomon's reading and concludes, “Meursault does not gain much consciousness as a character” (p.254). However, claiming Meursault's existential predicament to be only a result of a stunted psychological growth not only denies its ontological implications but also infantilises him and reduces the gravity of his crime.

Dissenting views regarding Heidegger's adaptability to Camus

Now, it might be argued that reading Heidegger and Camus together poses a problem due to their fundamental differences —while Heidegger's primary domain was phenomenological ontology, Camus was more of a humanist (Feibleman, 1963), dealing with humans' experience with the absurd. Again, whereas Heidegger was a philosopher, Camus was a novelist who denied being a philosopher and captured his ideas in literary form (Sherman, 2009). Camus's explicit rejection of existentialism further distances him from the frameworks of Heidegger and Sartre. In an interview with Jeanine Delpech, Camus states, "I am not an existentialist. . . the only book of ideas that I have published, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, was directed against the so-called existentialist philosophers" (Camus, 1959/1967, p. 259). In that essay, he criticises existential thinkers' tendency to commit "philosophical suicide" (Camus, 1942/1975, p.32). Sherman writes, ". . . by Camus's lights, Heidegger also commits 'philosophical suicide,' for even if he begins from the concrete, he abstractly derives a transcendent meaning to which we ought to conform, which involves an 'authentic' comportment" (Sherman, 2009, p.42).

However, despite these differences, Camus and Heidegger can and should be read together because their ideas were products of the same period in history — a time ravaged by world wars and marked by a crisis of faith and anxiety. Heidegger was writing in the aftermath of WWI, while Camus's text appeared during WWII. Therefore, both were concerned with the same crisis that the mass destruction of life had generated throughout Europe. It is on this ground that a Heideggerian reading of *The Outsider* (also known as *The Stranger*) becomes relevant and powerful. Moreover, Camus (1942/1975) himself refers to Heideggerian "anxiety" in *The Myth of Sisyphus*. He writes: "[E]verything begins with consciousness. . . 'anxiety,' as Heidegger says, is at the source of everything" (p.19). Thus, reading Camus's text through a Heideggerian lens not only helps to engage with the ontological implications of Meursault's situation but also continues the conversation Camus himself initiated.

Camus's Meursault through the lens of Heidegger's Philosophy

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's primary concern was the "question of Being" and how this Being—which he understands as *Dasein*— can progress from "inauthenticity" to "authenticity". According to Heidegger (1927/1962), *Dasein* ("Being-there") initially finds itself "thrown" into an already existing world that it has not chosen for itself. In order to make sense of that world, *Dasein* starts behaving in accordance with the normative discourse of the society—a situation he understands as "fallenness". In "fallenness", *Dasein* lives its life inauthentically, for its ideas and behaviours are shaped by *das Man* or "the They" of the society. We live on with this "inauthentic" life quite satisfactorily until we are faced with the mood of "anxiety", in which we are suddenly

brought before the absurd nakedness of our existence, and all our prefixed notions about our lives and the world lose their significance, forcing us to stand at the edge of the great void of existence. Heidegger (1927/1962) states, “Anxiety thus takes away from *Dasein* the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted” (p. 232). For him, this mood of “anxiety” opens *Dasein* to the possibility of attaining “authenticity”. Since the world and all its discourses lose their meanings to *Dasein* at this stage, it starts noticing its own possibilities: anxiety “brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself” (p. 311). For Heidegger, this ultimate and inevitable possibility appears as death, an awareness of which can finally make *Dasein* free from the “everydayness” (*Alltäglichkeit*)—an “inauthentic” mode of existence in which “we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge. . . as they judge. . . we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking” (p. 164). Seen from this viewpoint, we can arrive at two conjectures about Camus’s text: firstly, Meursault seems to embody *Dasein*’s journey from “inauthenticity” to “authenticity”, and secondly, characters like the judge, the prosecutor, the caretaker, the secretary, and the priest represent the “fallenness” of *das Man*.

To give a brief context of the plot first, the novella revolves around its central character, Meursault, an office clerk from Algiers, and his unfathomable disinterest in the courses of the world he inhabits. The novella starts with a shockingly passive tone of the protagonist: “My mother died today. Or maybe yesterday, I don’t know. I received a telegram from the old people’s home: ‘Mother deceased. Funeral tomorrow. . .’ That doesn’t mean anything. It might have been yesterday” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 3). In the subsequent events that follow, we see Meursault visiting the old-age home, where almost everyone except him seems to mourn his mother’s demise. He spends the night drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes, and eventually dozing off. What appears more shocking is that he refuses to even see his mother once. The next day, he goes to the beach and comes across his former co-worker, Marie, with whom he starts a casual relationship. Thus, the apparent emotional insensitivity with which Meursault deals with his mother’s death establishes him as a character who does not function in accordance with what the normative social framework tells us to do. Society expects us to shed tears, mourn, and grieve at our loved ones’ funerals. But that preconceived framework gets threatened when someone like Meursault comes up and decides to do exactly the opposite of what is expected of him: sleep, swim, go to the movies, and have sex with a former co-worker right after his mother’s death. No wonder then, later in the text, he is condemned by the prosecutor and the society as “a moral monster” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 86).

The Outsider is divided into two parts: while the first part, focusing on the outside events, delineates the funeral of Meursault's mother and the events leading to his murder of the Arab, the second part focuses on Meursault's trial and takes us within his mind. When the second part opens, Meursault has already committed the heinous crime—he has already killed the brother of an Arab woman Raymond had been abusing. Ironically, during the trial, the prosecutors and judges (representatives of *das Man*) get more focused on examining Meursault's nonchalant attitude at his mother's funeral than the crime for which he was being held. The fact that he smoked and drank coffee at his mother's wake is brought to the fore as the workings of a criminal mind. The prosecutor even goes so far as to say, "I accuse this man of having buried his mother with the heartlessness of a criminal" (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 87).

Significantly, after Meursault has been sentenced to death, we see an apparent transformation in him. While throughout the narrative, we hardly get any glimpse of his emotional state, after his verdict, Meursault seems to be eloquent with words—words that express his emotional condition. Initially, he desperately tries to think of ways in which he can escape the inevitable. Eventually, however, he not only realises the irrefutability of his fate but also accepts his imminent death with certainty. Therefore, when the novella ends, we find a Meursault who is not desperately trying to evade his death but is rather calm and at ease with his impending doom—he says, "I had been happy, and I was still happy" (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 111).

In his essay "Novel of the Stranger" (in *Faux Pas*), Maurice Blanchot (1943/2001) talks about a flaw in the ending. In his opinion, Meursault deviates from his characteristics in the last pages of the book when he suddenly becomes too expressive (p. 221). However, it is Meursault's very articulation towards the end of the book that hints at his ultimate realisation of the fundamental truth of his life, which is death. Death is at the centre of Heidegger's philosophy, according to which the acceptance of one's own finitude makes *Dasein* "being-toward-death" (*Sein-zum-Tode*)—a fundamental key to *Dasein*'s "authentic" existence, in which *Dasein* confronts its own mortality and embraces the fact that it is always on a journey towards its own death. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/1962) describes death as the "possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all" (p. 307). It is not just mere awareness of death but the realisation that we may die at any point in time and cease to exist altogether. Meursault attains this ultimate realisation only towards the end of the book when he is seen waiting for the Grim Reaper to knock at his door.

In order to understand Meursault's journey through the lens of Heidegger's philosophy, one first needs to understand the stages *Dasein* goes through before reaching the "authentic" realm of existence. Broadly speaking, the stages go like this: from "thrownness" to "fallenness"

to “anxiety” to “authenticity”. “Anxiety” is the most crucial of these four stages because it is at this stage that *Dasein* goes through an epiphanic realisation of its own “fallenness”, rejects the “everydayness” of life, and begins its journey towards “authenticity”. From the beginning, Meursault emerges as a man who has already reached the stage of “anxiety” before the opening of the text. Heidegger’s “anxiety” shall not be confused with general anxiety or fear. For Heidegger (1927/1962), it is the fundamental mood of Being that brings *Dasein* out of its “fallenness”—or, to quote J. M. Magrini (2006), it “provokes a shattering breakdown in the everyday, familiar ways in which *Dasein* conducts its life” (p.79). The idea is that once we reach the stage of “anxiety”, the world and its normative discourses start appearing meaningless to us. This feeling of meaninglessness is central to Meursault’s perception of the world. Throughout the novel, Meursault finds things to be meaningless, and his sole mantra seems to be that nothing matters. At this stage of “anxiety”, the world has already lost its meaning to Meursault, who has realised that normative social discourses do not amount to anything. Therefore, when his girlfriend, Marie, asks him if he wants to marry her, he replies that “it was all the same to [him]” and that “it was of no importance whatsoever” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 38). When his boss offers him a job in Paris, his dry reply is, “. . . actually, I didn’t care one way or the other” (Camus, 1942/2013, p.38). When asked by his boss if he is not interested in changing his life, he asserts, “. . . You can never really change your life and that, in any case, every life was more or less the same. . .” (Camus, 1942/2013, p.38). Later, when asked by the prosecutor if his mother’s death has upset him, he replies, “I undoubtedly loved Mama very much, but that didn’t mean anything” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 58).

Therefore, echoing Magrini (2006), it may be said about Meursault that “at the moment anxiety swells”, *Dasein* (here Meursault) “no longer feels at home within the comfort and safety of its inauthentic ‘being-in-the-world,’ as the thoughts and interpretations of the ‘they-self’ lose meaning, force, and significance” (p. 79). The reason why Meursault does not mourn his mother’s death, does not acknowledge the importance of marriage, and does not find the prospect of working in Paris exciting is because, in the mood of anxiety, he has realised his own “thrownness” and subsequent “fallenness” in the world— a view that has also been articulated by Khali (2021). This “thrownness” refers to the idea that we are born into a particular cultural, historical, and social context from which we cannot be extricated (Heidegger, 1927/1962). In *Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reader’s Guide*, William Blattner (2006) simplifies Heidegger’s argument: “Our fundamental experience of the world is one of familiarity. . . our sense of identity . . . cannot be disentangled from the world around us” (p. 12). Heidegger (1927/1962)

terms this as “being-in-the-world” (*In-der-Welt-sein*), which emphasises *Dasein*’s familiarity with the world, suggesting that humans are always inherently embedded within it.

This involvement with the world often puts *Dasein* at the risk of “falling” into the “everydayness” of life. Heidegger states, “Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of *Dasein* itself . . . it constitutes all *Dasein*’s days in their everydayness” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 224). Interestingly, Meursault’s “fallenness” is not portrayed to us in the book. The narrative starts at a moment when Meursault has already been afflicted with the mood of “anxiety”. This is why when the book opens, Meursault seems to have a pretty good understanding of his own “thrownness” and “fallenness”. It is true that he goes to work, visits the old age home after his mother’s death, keeps Raymond company, and hangs out with Marie—but he does all of these while having an acute awareness of their meaninglessness. Therefore, whatever he does, he does with the knowledge that nothing matters. It can be assumed, therefore, that Meursault has passed the initial stage of his “fallenness” before the novella opens. This is not just mere speculation. Omar Khali (2021) provides an example from the text to show why he thinks that Meursault’s disillusionment in the mood of “anxiety” happens during his earlier days. Meursault once tells us, “When I was a student, I was very ambitious about having a career. But when I had to give up my studies, I realized quite soon that none of that sort of thing mattered very much” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 38). It was at this moment when Meursault was confronted with “anxiety”, which revealed to him in a moment of truth the nothingness and meaninglessness of human existence (Khali, 2021).

So far, we see that the mood of “anxiety” has revealed to Meursault his own “thrownness” and “fallenness”. For Meursault, then, who has already attained the mood of “anxiety” before the beginning of the text, the next step that remains is to become “authentic”. But how does one become “authentic”? As already discussed before, Heidegger (1927/1962) says that to be “authentic”, one must first have the anagnorisis of his own “thrownness” and “fallenness”. Meursault has already had this anagnorisis. The next step then is to embrace the “finitude” of his own existence (“being-toward-death”). This, too, we have briefly mentioned earlier. Having been afflicted with “anxiety”, the “inauthentic” *Dasein* flees in the face of nothingness—his own death and finitude—but the “authentic” *Dasein* embraces it and starts taking responsibility for its own potential. Meursault also becomes “being-toward-death” after his verdict of death.

Meursault’s “being-toward-death” is particularly evident in his confrontation with the priest. Initially, after being sentenced to death, Meursault thinks of ways in which he can “escape the inevitable”—“What I’m concerned about at present is how to avoid the guillotine. . .”, he says

(Camus, 1942/2013, p. 98). From fantasising about getting his appeal passed to thinking of attending every execution if he gets to evade his doom, Meursault seems desperate to avoid death, which proves that he is yet to be “authentic”. But when the priest (representing *das Man*) repeatedly tries to persuade Meursault to repent to God, Meursault gives in to a sudden outburst: he snaps at the priest, grabs him by his collar, and articulates his inner anguish, firmly stating, “I had very little time left and I didn’t want to waste it on God” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 108). He further says:

He seemed so sure of himself, didn’t he? But not one of his certainties was worth a single strand of a woman’s hair. He wasn’t even sure he was alive because he lived life as if he were dead. . . but I was sure of myself, sure of everything, sure of my life, sure of my impending death (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 109).

This is the first time we see a glimpse of the “authentic” *Dasein* in Meursault. Not only does he accept his finitude and become “being-toward-death”, but he also condemns the “fallenness” of the priest. Ingrid Fernandez (2014) rightly remarks, “What angers Meursault lies in the priest’s frantic effort to ignore the world around him in search of abstract redemption” (p. 153). In other words, the priest’s “fallenness” angers Meursault. In fact, besides the priest, characters like the judge and the prosecutor also represent Heidegger’s “fallenness”, and this becomes evident in the courtroom scene where almost everyone comes with the preconceived notion that not crying at one’s mother’s funeral makes one a criminal at heart.

Based on the argument developed till now, it might be tempting to conclude that, unlike those other “fallen” characters, Meursault successfully achieves “authenticity” because he embraces his own finitude towards the end. Rossi also believes that Meursault reaches “authenticity” through an eventual acceptance of guilt and death. He traces Meursault’s final acknowledgement of his guilt to the assertion: “. . . for the first time, I realized I was guilty” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 81), and argues that it is “his first explicit confession of unqualified guilt” (Rossi, 1958, p. 409). What Rossi fails to realise, I believe, is that even if Meursault experiences a subtle sense of guilt — he repeatedly has the feeling of being judged — he neither actively acknowledges nor seriously reflects on his guilt. Even when he says that he realised he was guilty, the assertion reflects his realisation of being guilty in the eyes of the world, rather than a moment of personal epiphany. What Meursault actually says is, “I then felt some sort of indignation filling the courtroom and, for the first time, I realised I was guilty” (Camus, 1942/2013, p. 81). It is this “indignation” that makes him realise that society considers him guilty. At another point, he says, “I’d only been told I was guilty. I was guilty, I was paying for it, no one could ask any more of me” (Camus,

1942/2013, p.107). Clearly, the subtle unconscious guilt is never fully realised — nor deeply felt — by Meursault himself. Again, Rossi (1958) says, “Out of [Meursault’s] anguish will come the final freedom in the face of death” (p. 408). While it is true that Meursault does become “being-toward-death” and achieve some degree of existential freedom towards the end, it would be problematic to declare that he fully achieves “authenticity” because he neither owns up to his mistakes nor ever takes responsibility for his actions.

Responsibility and self-awareness are two crucial factors for *Dasein*’s “authenticity”. Michael Watts (2014) writes that the “authentic” *Dasein* must always assume “full responsibility for its own life. . .” (p. 264). Rossi (1958) argues that by deciding to shoot the four shots after the first one and by choosing not to deny or repent for his crime, Meursault consciously enacts his freedom and takes responsibility: “[T]he four shots are fired by Meursault at the high noon of conscience. They are a re-enactment of the fatal first shot, an assumption of responsibility, a deliberate and ‘free’ choice of the self . . .” (p. 407). For Rossi, this assertion of freedom, coupled with his silence in the courtroom, represents Meursault taking responsibility for his action. Rossi writes

Meursault shows his readiness to accept the consequence of his act when he makes a confession of his guilt by way of omission. The investigating magistrate asks him three times to explain why he had fired upon a prostrate body, and each time Meursault answers only with his silence . . . he does not deny the self he has chosen (p. 408).

In the footnote to the last sentence, he adds, “Meursault does not deny ‘Christ’ (his authentic self)” (p. 408). For Rossi, then, not denying his crime expresses his acknowledgement of his guilt and his determination to stand his ground — something that makes him “authentic”. However, calling his act of violence a glimpse of the “authentic” self inevitably elevates his crime to a moment of heroism, completely overlooking the fact that the last four shots represent his cold-blooded murderous instinct, not his “authentic” self.

Taking responsibility requires self-awareness, not unnecessary violence. Meursault shows no self-awareness until the very end— it is only when he realises that he is going to die that he achieves some sort of awareness, but by that time, it is too late. Rossi (1958) reads the murder as an instance of Meursault taking responsibility. But being “authentic” does not mean rejecting the world and its people—Heidegger’s very notion of *Dasein* is that it is always already embedded within the world and cannot be separated from it. Watts (2014) rightly points out that for Heidegger “living authentically is not an escape from our world. . . instead it is an involvement that arises from a deeper, more authentic understanding of life, which enables and inspires us to

make clear-sighted, determined choices from among the possibilities made available to us by our culture” (p. 86).

Murdering an unknown person definitely does not represent such a deeper understanding of life; it just exposes Meursault’s failure to maintain one of the very fundamental conditions of *Dasein* as a “being-in-the-world”—“solicitude” (*Fürsorge*). “Solicitude” is a form of “care” (*Sorge*) that refers to *Dasein*’s state of “Being-with” (*Mitsein*), i.e., *Dasein*’s caring for others (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Here, we should refer to Frederick Olafson’s assertion about “solicitude”, which Watts (2014) mentions in his book. Olafson argues that Heidegger’s concept of “solicitude” unmistakably upholds an ethical character. He says, “This is the concept of *Fürsorge*— one human being’s caring about another — and it is this caring that [Heidegger] declares to be . . . central to our being with one another” (p. 260). Now, for Heidegger, there are two modes of “solicitude”: “inauthentic” and “authentic” (Watts, 2014). Whereas “inauthentic solicitude” annihilates others’ individualities by making them dependent, “authentic solicitude” cares by helping them “take responsibility for their own lives” (Watts, 2014, p. 266).

For Heidegger (1927/1962), even when a *Dasein* becomes “authentic”, it does not stop existing as a “being-in-the-world” (although in the mood of “anxiety” it cares the most about his existence as a “being-toward-death”). Therefore, Meursault’s act of murder not only emerges as a sheer failure to take “care” of the other but is also a rejection of the world itself. Although *Dasein*’s freedom to choose oneself and one’s own most possibility is a crucial aspect of being “authentic”, this freedom comes with some limitations. In “Existentialism is a Humanism”, Sartre (1946/2007) argues that since humans do not have a deterministic factor that defines their being, they are endowed with infinite freedom — “man is free, man is freedom” (p.29). But this freedom comes with a profound responsibility because our actions not merely define our essence but also affect and shape mankind at large. This is why Sartre argues, “I am therefore responsible for myself and for everyone else . . . In choosing myself, I choose man” (pp. 24-25). Meursault lacks this sense of responsibility throughout the text. Even on the verge of death, he never grasps the implications of his actions. Not for once does he show any sign of guilt for having killed the Arab, nor does he feel any sense of remorse for having helped Raymond abuse his Arab mistress. Thus, even if Meursault accepts his finitude, he never takes any responsibility for his actions; even if he becomes self-aware, his awareness is only halfway developed.

Conclusion

Therefore, proclaiming that Meursault achieves “authenticity” by the end of the text would be an error of judgement. Meursault, in the mood of “anxiety”, indeed rejects his “fallenness” and makes certain progression towards being an “authentic” *Dasein*— his “being-toward-death” before his execution would definitely support this argument. But the very fact that he fails to develop a sense of responsibility for his actions acts as an antithesis to the previous argument. Meursault’s journey from his “inauthentic” self to his “authentic” self, therefore, remains incomplete. He neither remains a fallen individual nor becomes an “authentic” *Dasein*. Trying to put Meursault in one category (either “inauthentic” or “authentic”) would make us inevitably fall into the same trap that Camus has so vehemently criticised: the relentless reaching after meanings and certainties where none are to be found. In *The Myth of Sisyphus*, Camus (1942/1975) embraces the uncertainty of the absurd. His Sisyphus does not reach after formulating any meaning out of his meaningless task — instead, he embraces his condition and lives with it lucidly. Camus (1975) writes, “One must imagine Sisyphus happy” (p. 111). Similarly, his protagonist, too, occupies a central ambiguous state — he remains somewhere in-between. It is in this crepuscularity or liminality of his situation that the absurd seems to lie.

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